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PREFACE 
This paper deals with a field of study in the Systems and Deci- 
sion Sciences Area that focuses on institutional structures and their role 
in shaping decisions. One aspect of this task is concerned with institu- 
tions that make decisions by voting: this has wide application in both 
governmental and nongovernmental (e.g. corporate) contexts. A par- 
ticular problem addressed by this task is how to operationally define 
the idea of the "power" of different actors in a voting body. The 
result is a set of models that can be used as a normative basis for esti- 
mating the effects different institutional arrangements have on the 
relative power of their members. 
In this paper two basic models of power are described and 
applications are made to a variety of examples. Some concepts and 
notation from game theory are used, but the style is mainly expository, 
relying in some cases on results proved formally in a previous IIASA 
Research Report by the author, Power, Prices, and Incomes in Voting 
Systems. The present paper summarizes and interprets some of these 
earlier results, and goes on to  develop a second approach to  measuring 
power that is applicable in somewhat different contexts. 

SUMMARY 
The intent of this paper is two-fold. First, given lobbying and 
campaigning as a fact of life in the political sphere, we ask how should 
a calculating lobbyist allocate his resources most effectively t o  achieve 
his goals? Two models are presented: the case of one lobbyist acting 
unopposed, and the case of two opposing lobbyists; each is shown to  
lead t o  a certain concept of equilibrium payments t o  voters. These 
solutions may find practical application by practitioners of lobbying 
and campaigning. But the models also have a theoretical interest: 
they provide a new approach to  the problem of finding a normative 
measure of power in a voting system. In fact, two new measures of 
power are defined. While they are related in certain ways, their dif- 
ferences also point t o  the importance of considering the context of 
the problem in which power is to  be measured. 

Lobbying and Campaigning with 
Applications to the Measure of Power 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
The object of representative institutions being to give a 
voice to the diverse interests of society, it cannot be held 
surprising that particular interests will use whatever means 
lie at their disposal to influence the votes of the representa- 
tives. The nature of the influence takes many forms: from the 
provision of information favorable to a particular point of 
view, to private vacations and gifts, to outright bribes. 
The phenomenon of vote buying has been known since ancient 
times. Plutarch reports that Clodius, after being caught in 
Caesar's house (in pursuit of Caesar's wife) masquerading as a 
woman at a female ritual, greased the palms of a calculated 
majority of the judges, and was acquitted. Cicero gave testi- 
mony against Clodius, and after the acquittal, Clodius questioned 
whether the judges had believed Cicero's testimony. "Yes", 
replied Cicero, "five-and-twenty of them trusted me and con- 
demned you, and the other thirty did not trust you, for they 
did not acquit you till they had got your money" [14]. 
In modern times, lobbying and campaigning has come to be 
accepted, within limits, as a normal part of representative 
government. For example, a so-called "stringent" code of ethics 
recently passed by the United States House of Representatives 
(but not to take effect until 1979) restricts outside income 
to a total of 15% of a member's salary, limits "honoraria" to 
$1000, and provides for the disclosure of the source of gifts 
exceeding certain amounts.* Campaigning for votes through large 
expenditures, mobilized by party organizations, has become an 
*Bill passed in the U.S. House of Representatives, March 2, 1977. 
i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p r o c e s s .  Indeed  it i s  sometimes 
s a i d  t h a t  it i s  t h e  b a l a n c i n g  o f  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  p a r t i c u l a r  
i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  o f t e n  l e a d s  t o  a  d e c i s i o n  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i t  must a l s o  b e  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t ,  
f r e q u e n t l y ,  o n l y  one  i n t e r e s t  g roup  o r  l o b b y i s t  h a s  b o t h  a  
h i g h  s t a k e  i n  a  g i v e n  i s s u e  and t h e  w h e r e w i t h a l  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  
outcome. The problem i s ,  how s h o u l d  s u c h  a  l o b b y i s t  d e p l o y  h i s  
r e s o u r c e s  amongst t h e  v a r i o u s  v o t e r s  t o  e f f i c i e n t l y  a c h i e v e  h i s  
e n d s ?  How does  h i s  s t r a t e g y  d i f f e r  when he e n c o u n t e r s  a  lobby-  
i s t  on t h e  o p p o s i t e  s i d e  o f  t h e  i s s u e ,  from t h e  c a s e  when he 
i s  unopposed? I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  p a r t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  compet ing f o r  
v o t e s ,  what is  t h e  most e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  campaign f u n d s ?  
I n  t h i s  paper  we d e s c r i b e  how a  c a l c u l a t i n g  l o b b y i s t  ( o r  
p a r t y )  s h o u l d  a l l o c a t e  h i s  r e s o u r c e s  most e f f i c i e n t l y - - b o t h  
i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  an  opponent ,  and when he o p e r a t e s  unopposed. 
The s t y l e  o f  t h e  p a p e r  is  c h i e f l y  e x p o s i t o r y ,  and p r o o f s  of  
c e r t a i n  t e c h n i c a l  r e s u l t s - - p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  one 
l o b b y i s t  model--are g i v e n  e l s e w h e r e  [ 1 9 ] .  Var ious  a p p l i c a -  
t i o n s  o f  t h e  models a r e  d i s c u s s e d ,  i n c l u d i n g  s u c h  d i v e r s e  prob- 
lems a s  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s a l a r i e s  of  v a r i o u s  
members o f  government,  and  campaign fund  a l l o c a t i o n s  i n  U.S. 
P r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n s .  F i n a l l y ,  it i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  
r e s u l t i n g  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  l e a d  t o  two i n t e r e s t i n g  new v a l u e  
c o n c e p t s  f o r  n-person s i m p l e  games. 
2 .  LOBBYING WITHOUT OPPOSITION 
A v o t i n g  game ( a l s o  known a s  a  s i m p l e  game) is s p e c i f i e d  
by a  s e t  N o f  v o t e r s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a  l i s t  S  o f  a l l  s u b s e t s  S  
o f  v o t e r s  ( c a l l e d  w i n n i n g  s e t s )  whose s u p p o r t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
p a s s  a  measure .  Thus ,  S  i s  a  winning s e t  i f  a  measure would 
p a s s  when a l l  t h e  v o t e r s  i n  S  v o t e  y e s  and a l l  t h e  v o t e r s  n o t  
i n  S v o t e  n o .  The f o l l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  u s u a l l y  assumed 
f o r  any v o t i n g  game G = (N,S):  
( 1 )  and Q @  S , S  E S  and S  S T  i m p l i e s  T  E S , 
t h a t  i s ,  i f  S  wins ,  t h e n  any s e t  c o n t a i n i n g  S  a l s o  wins .  
Given ( I ) ,  it i s  easy  t o  s e e  t h a t  t o  d e s c r i b e  G we need 
o n l y  s p e c i f y  t h e  minima2 winning sets S  such  t h a t  no p r o p e r  
s u b s e t  o f  S  i s  a  winning s e t .  
A common example o f  a  v o t i n g  game i s  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  w e i g h t e d  
v o t i n g  game. Here each  of t h e  p l a y e r s  i ,  1  ~ i s n ,  - - c a s t s  a  v o t e  
w i t h  w e i g h t  wi ,  and a  b i l l  p a s s e s  i f  and o n l y  i f  t h e  t o t a l  
we igh ted  v o t e  f o r  t h e  b i l l  i s  a t  l e a s t  a s  h i g h  a s  a  g i v e n  q u o t a  
q > 0; t h u s  t h e  winning s e t s  a r e  
and t h e  game has  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  ( q ;  wl ,w2, . . . ,Wn).  
I t  has  been s a i d  t h a t  "every  man h a s  h i s  p r i c e " .  I n  t h i s  
paper  we w i l l  be i n t e r e s t e d  i n  how v o t e r s '  p r i c e s  migh t  be 
de te rmined  i n  t e rms  of  t h e i r  " v a l u e "  t o  a  l o b b y i s t  t r y i n g  t o  
buy v o t e s .  The models a r e  s i m p l i f i e d ,  and do n o t  p r e t e n d  
t o  d e a l  w i t h  such  f a c t o r s  a s  t h e  b a r g a i n i n g  s k i l l  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
v o t e r s  ( o r  o f  t h e  l o b b y i s t ) ,  o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
c o a l i t i o n s  forming.  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, w h i l e  t h e  models a p p e a r  
t o  b e  c o m p l e t e l y  c y n i c a l  ( i . e . ,  by assuming t h a t  e v e r y o n e ' s  v o t e  
can  b e  b o u g h t ) ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  can  be made j u s t  a s  w e l l  f o r  t h e  
c a s e  where some v o t e r s  would v o t e  w i t h  t h e  l o b b y i s t  anyway, and 
o t h e r s  c a n n o t  be bought  a t  a l l  ( s e e  S e c t i o n  8 be low) .  I n d e e d ,  
t h i s  j u s t  amounts t o  s a y i n g  t h a t  some v o t e r s  have a  p r i c e  of 
z e r o ,  and o t h e r s  have a  p r i c e  o f  p l u s  i n f i n i t y .  
We b e g i n  w i t h  t h e  assumpt ion  t h a t  a  l o b b y i s t  h a s  a  l a r g e  
q u a n t i t y  o f  funds  a t  h i s  d i s p o s a l ,  and a  b i l l  ( o r  s e v e r a l  b i l l s )  
t h a t  he would l i k e  t o  have p a s s e d .  The p a s s a g e  of t h e s e  b i l l s  
i s  assumed t o  b e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  v a l u a b l e  t o  him t h a t  he i s  w i l l i n g  
( l i k e  C l o d i u s )  t o  pay t h e  p r i c e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  have t h e  measure 
p a s s  w i t h  c e r t a i n t y ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  mere ly  w i t h  some h i g h  
p r o b a b i l i t y :  i n  o t h e r  words ,  h e  i s  o u t  t o  c a n t u r e  some 
winn ing  s e t ,  and i s  assumed t o  have t h e  f u n d s  r e q u i s i t e  
t o  do s o .  For  a  " v i r g i n  l e q i s l a t u r e " ,  we mav e x p e c t  t h a t  
t h e  s u p p l y  o f  v o t e r s  a t  v a r i o u s  p o s s i b l e  p r i c e s  h a s  t h e  
c l a s s i c a l  shape ;  some p e r h a p s  w i l l  g o  a l o n g  f o r  n o t h i n g  and ,  
a s  t h e  p r i c e  p a i d  goes  up, i n c r e a s i n g l y  many v o t e r s  w i l l  be 
p u r c h a s a b l e  a t  t h a t  p r i c e  o r  l e s s :  
The minimum p r i c e s  a t  which t h e  v o t e r s  a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  o f f e r  
0 0 0 t h e m s e l v e s  w i l l  be  deno ted  by t h e  p r i c e  v e c t o r  p0 = ( p l  , p 2 , .  . . , p n )  . 
V o t e r s  may a r r i v e  a t  t h e s e  p r i c e s ,  c a l l e d  minimum e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  
by c a l c u l a t i o n s  t h a t  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e  r i s k  o f  a c c e p t i n g  a  
b r i b e ,  w i t h  t h e  p o s s i b l e  l o s s  o f  income, p r e s t i g e ,  o r  p e r s o n a l  
honor i f  c a u g h t .  Lacking more d e t a i l e d  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  we may some- 
t i m e s  assume, f o r  a  p r i o r i  c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  t h a t  t h i s  " s u p p l y  c u r v e "  
i s  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c ,  i .e .  t h a t  a l l  v o t e r s  have  t h e  same mini -  
mum p r i c e :  
p r i c e  1 
I number o f  v o t e r s  
The b e h a v i o r  o f  t h e  l o b b y i s t  i s  summarized by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
axiom. 
( 2 )  The l o b b y i s t  w i l t  b r i b e  t h e  l e a s t  e x p e n s i u e  c o l l e c t i o n  
o f  p l a y e r s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  pass  t h e  measure .  
Given this assumption, and supposing that all players have 
equal influence (for example, they all have the same number of 
votes in a weighted voting game), the lobbyist's course of action 
seems clear: he should begin bribing at the low end of the 
supply curve and proceed until he has bought a coalition just 
sufficient to win. If some players are structurally more 
important than others, which is the interesting case from the 
theoretical point of view, then the lobbyist could find the least 
cost winning set by calculating costs on a per  v o t e  basis,in the 
case of a weighted voting game for example. However, in this 
case,it may also be possible for some players to obtain more 
than their minimum price because of their strategic positions. 
The problem is to determine whether an "equilibrium" set of 
prices exists in this case, and how to find it. 
Example 1 
The New York City Board of Estimates consists of eight 
members having weighted votes as shown in Table 1, a simple 
weighted majority being required to pass [lo]. 




Council President 4 
Brooklyn Borough President 2 
Manhattan Borough President 2 
Queens Borough President 2 
Bronx Borough President 2 
Richmond Borough President 2 
Total weight 2 2 
A lobbyist representing certain interests in New York City 
might attempt to influence the Board by offering them consider- 
ations in return for their votes. Certain members of the Board 
might respond by indicating whether the price offered is too 
low ( i . e . ,  below t h e i r  minimum e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  o r  what t h e y  would 
c o n s i d e r  w o r t h w h i l e  under  any  c o n d i t i o n s ) .  But i f  t h e y  set t h e i r  
p r i c e s  t o o  h i g h ,  t h e  l o b b y i s t  a lways  h a s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
a p p r o a c h i n g  o t h e r  members who may n o t  b e  s o  demanding. 
Suppose t h a t  a l l  members have a  minimum p r i c e  o f  $1000. 
While  t h e  s u p p l y  c u r v e  f o r  v o t e r s  i s  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c ,  o n  a  per 
v o t e  b a s i s ,  t h e  Mayor, t h e  C o n t r o l l e r ,  and t h e  C o u n c i l  P r e s i d e n t  
a r e  a  b e t t e r  buy. I n  f a c t ,  t h e s e  t h r e e  p l a y e r s  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  
unique  l e a s t - c o s t  winn ing  set. T h i s  means i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h a t  
some, o r  a l l  o f  them, c o u l d  a s k  f o r  more and g e t  away w i t h  it. 
How much more? I f  t h e  Mayor r a i s e s  h i s  p r i c e  t o  more t h a n  $2000, 
t h e n  any  two Borough P r e s i d e n t s  c a n  b e  s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  him a t  
less c o s t ;  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  l o b b y i s t  c a n  p l a u s i b l y  walk away from 
a n y  s u c h  p r i c e  demand by t h e  Mayor. On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  f o r  any 
p r i c e  l e s s  t h a n  $2000 t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  p l a y e r s  s t i l l  c o n s t i t u t e  
t h e  u n i q u e  l e a s t - c o s t  winn ing  set. Thus, i f  t h e  l o b b y i s t  w a l k s  
away from a  p r i c e  demand by t h e  Mayor o f ,  s a y ,  $1900, t h e  l o b b y i s t  
may end up hav ing  t o  pay more t o  g e t  h i s  winn ing  set .  On t h e  
o t h e r  hand,  t h e  Mayor w i l l  g e t  n o t h i n g .  A b a r g a i n i n g  p r o c e s s  
may e s t a b l i s h  some p r i c e  i n  between t h e  Mayor's  minimum and t h e  
p r i c e  ($2000) above which o t h e r  p l a y e r s  u n d e r c u t  him, depend ing  
on t h e  r e l a t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g  a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  l o b b y i s t  and t h e  
Mayor, o r  o n  o t h e r  a s s u m p t i o n s .  
I n  t h i s  model w e  s h a l l  make t h e  s i m p l i f y i n g  a s s u m p t i o n  
t h a t  t h e  l o b b y i s t  i s  a  p r i c e  t a k e r ,  i .e . ,  t h a t  h i s  o n l y  a b i l i t y  
t o  b a r g a i n  l i es  i n  h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  g o i n g  t o  some o t h e r  
p l a y e r s  who w i l l  c o s t  him less. Thus,  f o r  any g i v e n  v e c t o r  o f  
p r i c e s  p = ( p l , p 2 ,  . . . , p  ,) t h a t  a r e  f e a s i b l e  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  
- 
0 
p_ 2 p_ , t h e  l o b b y i s t  c h o o s e s  a  w i n n i n g  set S  s u c h  t h a t  1 pi 
i s  a  minimum, and p a y s  p i  t o  e a c h  i E  S. I f  t h e r e  i ES 
a r e  s e v e r a l  minimum c o s t  sets f o r  p ,  t h e  l o b b y i s t  c h o o s e s  o n e  
- 
o f  them. Thus,  f o r  any f e a s i b l e  p  t h e r e  i s  a n  a s s o c i a t e d  set  S  
- 
o f  b r i b e e s  f (p_) .  The f u n c t i o n  f  i s  c a l l e d  t h e  payment schedule  
f o r  t h e  l o b b y i s t .  
I n  t h e  t e rmino logy  o f  game t h e o r y ,  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  a  payment 
s c h e d u l e ,  f ,  by t h e  l o b b y i s t  d e f i n e s  a n  n-person game on t h e  
v o t e r s  i n  which t h e  s t r a t e g y  o f  a  v o t e r  i s  t o  q u o t e  a  p r i c e  
0 pi 2 pi ,  and t h e  p a y o f f  e q u a l s  pi i f  i E f ( p )  ( i . e . ,  i f  i i s  
- 
b r i b e d )  and z e r o  o t h e r w i s e .  R e t u r n i n g  t o  o u r  example ,  we see 
t h a t  t h e  Mayor c a n  c h a r g e  any  amount up t o  $2000 and g e t  away 
w i t h  it. By a  s i m i l a r  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  C o n t r o l l e r  and t h e  C o u n c i l  
P r e s i d e n t  c a n  a l s o  r a i s e  t h e i r  p r i c e s  up  t o  $2000 each .  A t  t h e  
b reakeven  p o i n t ,  namely 
it happens  t h a t  a l l  minimal winn ing  sets c o s t  t h e  same, $6000, 
s o  t h e  l o b b y i s t  c a n  choose  t o  b r i b e  any one  o f  them t o  e q u a l  
a d v a n t a g e .  Suppose t h a t ,  i n  f a c t ,  h e  chooses  t o  b r i b e  t h e  f i r s t  
t h r e e  p l a y e r s .  (One p l a u s i b l e  r e a s o n  f o r  such  a  c h o i c e  i s  t h a t  
it i s  t h e  s m a l l e s t  winning  set ,  hence  t h e r e  a r e  fewer  v o t e r s  t o  
d e a l  w i t h . )  Then t h e  p r i c e  v e c t o r  ( 3 )  h a s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r o p e r t y :  
No p l a y e r  o r  group o f  p l a y e r s  i s  a b l e  t o  change t o  some 
o t h e r  f e a s i b l e  s e t  o f  p r i c e s  such t h a t  each  does  s t r i c t l y  
b e t t e r  t h a n  b e f o r e .  
Such a  p i s  s a i d  t o  b e  a  s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m  1131 . 
I t  i s  a  remarkab le  f a c t  t h a t ,  i f  t h e  v o t i n g  game G h a s  no 
v e t o  p l a y e r ,  t h a t  i s ,  no p l a y e r  whose agreement  is  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
win ,  t h e n  a  s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m  a lways  e x i s t s  f o r  any s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
0 
o f  minimum p r i c e s  p (see (9) below) . 
For  Example 1  above ,  it t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  p r i c e  v e c t o r  
( 3 )  i s ,  e s s e n t i a l l y ,  t h e  un ique  s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  i n  a  s e n s e  
t o  be  made p r e c i s e  below. Moreover,  u n i q u e n e s s  t y p i c a l l y  
h o l d s  f o r  many r e a l  examples  o f  v o t i n g  games (and e q u a l  minimum 
p r i c e s ) .  However, t h e r e  a r e  a l s o  v o t i n g  games w i t h  m u l t i p l e  
e q u i l i b r i a .  
Example 2  
Cons ider  t h e  weigh ted  v o t i n g  game on seven  v o t e r s  w i t h  
q u o t a  11 and w e i g h t s  ( 5 , 3 , 3 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 ) .  L e t  t h e  l o b b y i s t  have 
a  payment s c h e d u l e  f  t h a t  a lways  chooses  a  minimum c o s t  winning 
set ,  and ,moreover , i f  v o t e r s  1 , 2 , 3  c o n s t i t u t e  one such  set  among 
s e v e r a l ,  t h e n  t h i s  set  i s  t h e  o n e  chosen .  I f  minimum p r i c e s  a r e  
$1 e a c h ,  t h e n  t h e  p r i c e  v e c t o r  = ( 3 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 )  i s  a  s t r o n g  
e q u i l i b r i u m ,  and s o  is  p2 = (2.50,1.50,1.50,1,1,1,1) .  The l a t t e r ,  
- 
it may b e  observed ,  i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  w e i g h t s .  
Thus,  s e v e r a l  s t r o n q  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  may r e s u l t .  
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e r e  i s ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  one  among t h e  s t r o n g  e q u i l i -  
b r i a  t h a t  i s  more s t a b l e  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r s .  To see t h i s ,  it i s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c o a l i t i o n s .  
From t h e  o u t s e t ,  l e t  us  remark t h a t  c o a l i t i o n  f o r m a t i o n  i n  
t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  s e l l i n g  v o t e s  i s  p r o b a b l y  an  i n f r e q u e n t  phenomenon, 
s i n c e  s e c r e c y  i s  g e n e r a l l y  a t  a  premium. T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  f a c t ,  
n o t  a l l  p o s s i b l e  forms of  c o o p e r a t i v e  b e h a v i o r  w i l l  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .  
I n  Example 1 ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  c o n s i d e r  a  c o a l i t i o n  C c o n s i s t i n g  o f  
t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  v o t e r s ,  and l e t  each  of  them a g r e e  t o  c h a r g e  a  
v e r y  h i g h  p r i c e .  S i n c e  e v e r y  winning set  m e e t s  C ,  a t  l e a s t  one  
o f  them must b e  b r i b e d .  C can t h e r e f o r e  g u a r a n t e e  i t s e l f  a  v e r y  
h i g h  p a y o f f ,  p r o v i d e d  t h e  members can  a g r e e  on a  d i v i s i o n  of  t h e  
s p o i l s .  I n  f a c t ,  i f  we p o s t u l a t e  a  l a r g e  b u t  f i n i t e  budge t  l i m i t  
@ f o r  t h e  l o b b y i s t ,  C c a n  g u a r a n t e e  i t s e l f  ( u s i n g  p u r e  s t r a t e g i e s )  
a  payof f  o f  up t o  @/3.  I n  t h i s  way, t h e  c o o p e r a t i v e  v a l u e  o f  
d i f f e r e n t  c o a l i t i o n s  c o u l d  b e  d e f i n e d ;  u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e  c o r e  
d o e s  n o t  a lways  e x i s t  f o r  t h e s e  games. 
Moreover,  n o t i c e  t h a t ,  t y p i c a l l y ,  n o t  a l l  v o t e r s  i n  such  a  
c o a l i t i o n  w i l l  b e  b r i b e d ;  r a t h e r ,  some members r e c e i v e  a l l  t h e  
payments w h i l e  o t h e r s  r e c e i v e  n o t h i n g .  Such a  c o a l i t i o n  seems 
f r a g i l e ,  and presumes a n  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  d e g r e e  o f  c o o p e r a t i o n  
among t h e  c o a l i t i o n  members. N o t i c e ,  f o r  example,  t h a t  t h e  
members who a r e  n o t  d i r e c t l y  b r i b e d  do  n o t  even c o n t r o l  enough 
t o  a s s u r e  g e t t i n g  t h e i r  own minimum e x p e c t a t i o n s .  
But a  more fundamenta l  problem w i t h  t h i s  approach  is  t h a t  
i f  t h i s  d e g r e e  o f  c o o p e r a t i o n  i s  assumed, t h e n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
t h e  game i t s e l f  changes :  any  c o a l i t i o n  such  a s  C t h a t  wins  and 
m e e t s  e v e r y  o t h e r  winning s e t  c o u l d  s imply  a c t  a s  a  b l o c k  ( t h a t  
i s ,  a s  a  v e t o  p l a y e r )  and g u a r a n t e e  i t s e l f  a  p a y o f f  o f  f3. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e n  no v e r y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  way o f  i m p u t i n g  
s t a b l e  p a y o f f s  t o  t h e  v o t e r s . *  
R e t u r n i n g  t o  t h e  problem o f  d e f i n i n g  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  which 
i s  s t a b l e  under  some l i m i t e d  form o f  c o o p e r a t i v e  b e h a v i o r ,  it 
seems r e a s o n a b l e  t o  r e q u i r e ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h a t  i f  a  c o a l i t i o n  
i s  t o  h o l d  u n d e r  p r i c e s  p, t h e n  e v e r y  member o f  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  
- 
mus t  be  b r i b e d ,  i . e .  mus t  r e c e i v e  d i r e c t l y  h i s  minimum e x p e c t a t i o n .  
Thus,  i f  p  i s  a  p r i c e  v e c t o r ,  and t h e r e  e x i s t s  some c o a l i t i o n  
- 
o f  p l a y e r s  which can  a d j u s t  t h e i r  p r i c e s  s o  t h a t  
( 4 )  t h e  who le  c o a l i t i o n  i s  b r i b e d  
and 
(51 a f t e r  minimum e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  me t  t h e r e  i s  a  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  r e m a i n d e r  s u c h  t h a t  e a c h  
member o f  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  i s  s t r i c t l y  b e t t e r  o f f  
t h a n  b e f o r e ,  
t h e n  we may presume t h a t  s u c h  a  c o a l i t i o n  c o u l d  fo rm,  and t h a t  
t h e  g i v e n  p r i c e s  a r e  u n s t a b l e .  W e  s a y  t h a t  a  p r i c e  v e c t o r  
( p l  , p 2 , . .  . , p n )  = p i s  a  c o l l e c t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  ( f o r  eO) i f  
- 
t h e r e  i s  no c o a l i t i o n  o f  p l a y e r s  who c a n  change t h e i r  p r i c e s  
and improve t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  a s  i n  ( 4 )  and ( 5 )  . * *  
*For t h e s e  games t h e  c o r e  i s ,  i n  most c a s e s ,  empty. 
**More p r e c i s e l y ,  i s  a  c o l l e c t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  i f  t h e r e  is  no 
C S N ,  - C # @ ,  and f e a s i b l e  p r i c e s  p ' ,  where p !  = pi  f o r  a l l  
- 
i 9 C ,  such  t h a t  
c c f ( p _ ' l  1 
where = i s  a l l o w e d  o n l y  i f  C n f  (g) = 4 and p: > 0 
. . 
f o r  a l l  i E C . 
Every collective equilibrium is, in particular, a strong 
equilibrium, but a collective equilibrium has the additional 
property that it is stable against certain types of coalition 
formation with side-payments. It is therefore a considerably 
stronger concept of equilibrium than is usually considered-- 
indeed than normally exists--for n-person games. For the 
special class of games considered here, however, a collective 
equilibrium almost always does exist, and normally it is unique 
(see (9) below). Moreover, while this equilibrium seems to 
depend on the payment schedule f chosen by the lobbyist, we 
shall see that a description of the equilibrium can be given 
independently of f. 
Returning to Example 2, consider the prices p1 = (3,1,1,1, 
- 
l,l,l. The first three players, if they choose to cooperate, 
can collectively do better by adopting the prices $2.50,$1.50, 
$1.50 instead of $3,$1,$1. All three are assured of being 
bribed under the given payment schedule f; (alternatively they 
could shave off E from these prices and be assured of being 
bribed for any choice of f). Voter 1 gives up $.50, so the 
price of his cooperation must be that the other two will more 
than compensate him for his losses. They can do this and still 
retain more than $1 each for themselves. The price vector 1 
can therefore be upset by a coalition satisfying (4) and (5), 
so it is not a collective equilibrium. On the other hand, it 
may be verified that p2 = (2.50,l. 50,l. 50,1,1,1,1) is a collective 
- 
equilibrium. 
Are there other collective equilibria for this example? 
In a trivial sense, there are: for example another one is 
3 However, differs from p2 in an uninteresting way, 
- 
because the membe~s who count, i.e., the ones who are actually 
3  b r i b e d ,  r e c e i v e  t h e  same amount i n  b o t h  c a s e s ,  s i n c e  f ( ~  ) = 
2  f ( ~  ) = v o t e r s  { 1 , 2 , 3 ) .  For  g i v e n  w e  d e f i n e  a  c a n o n i c a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  E f o r  f ,  a l s o  c a l l e d  an  e q u i l i b r i u m  w i t h o u t  o p p o s i t i o n ,  
t o  be a  c o l l e c t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  f  i n  which t h e  members who 
a r e  n o t  b r l b e d  q u o t e  t h e i r  minimum e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  t h a t  is,  
0 pi = pi f o r  i 4 f  ( p _ )  . 
The r e s t r i c t i o n  t o  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i a  i s  j u s t i f i e d  by 
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f a c t  [ I  91 . 
( 8 )  E v e r y  c o l l e c t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p  f o r  f  d i f f e r s  f rom 
- 
a  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  6 o n l y  i n  t h a t  some p l a y e r s  
- 
who a r e  n o t  b r i b e d  (.i. e . ,  n o t  i n  f  ( p )  o r  i n  f  ( e ) )  
- - 
have  r a i s e d  t h e i r  p r i c e s .  
( 9 )  Theorem [191. If G has  no v e t o  p l a y e r s  t h e n ,  f o r  some f ,  
a  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  e x i s t s  and n o r m a l l y  i t  i s  u n i q u e .  
N o t i c e  t h a t ,  i f  G h a s  a  v e t o  p l a y e r  j ,  t h e n  t h i s  p l a y e r  i s  
i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  demand an  a r b i t r a r i l y  h i g h  p r i c e .  Hence, 
r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  o t h e r s ,  h i s  p r i c e  is  i n  some s e n s e  i n f i n i t e ,  and 
w e  s h o u l d  n o t  e x p e c t  an  e q u i l i b r i u m  t o  e x i s t  i n  t h i s  c a s e .  
(However, w e  might  compute an e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  t h e  remain ing  
v o t e r s  by s e t t i n g  t h e  p r i c e  o f  j  e q u a l  t o  m, and computing t h e  
p r i c e s  f o r  t h e  G' t h a t  r e s u l t s  by "removing" j :  G' = ( N , s ' )  
where s j  = { S  C N  : S U { j )  Es}.) 
I t  may be shown (see (12)  below) t h a t  p2 above i s  a c t u a l l y  
- 
t h e  u n i q u e  e q u i l i b r i u m  w i t h o u t  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r  t h e  g i v e n  minima 
i n  Example 2; s i m i l a r l y ,  ( 3 )  is  t h e  un ique  s o l u t i o n  f o r  
Example 1 .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  a r e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  
members' we igh ts .  T h i s  i s  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  Shapley-Shubik 
v a l u e s  [ 1 6 , 1 7 ] ,  which f o r  Example 1  a r e  i n  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n s  (2 .2:  
2.2:2.2:1:1:1:1:1),  and t o  t h e  Banznaf v a l u e s  [ I ] ,  which a r e  
i n  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n s  ( 2 . 1 7 : 2 . 1 7 : 2 . 1 7 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 ) .  
Any canonical equilibrium for a given set of minimum expec- 
tations may be computed, i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  f, by means of a 
certain linear program, the form of which gives insight into its 
0 0 
structure. For given minima (pl ,p2,. . . ,P:) = PO I let So be the 
- 
family of all winning sets that are minimum cost r e l a t i v e  t o  pol - 
The members of S will be called c r i t i c a l  s e t s .  
Further, let No, the set of c r i t i c a l  v o t e r s ,  be the voters 
contained in every critical set: 
Then [I91 
( 1 0 )  i n  any c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o n l y  t h e  c r i t i c a l  v o t e r s  
- 
can have p r i c e s  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e i r  minimum e x p e c t a t i o n s ;  
further , 
(1 1) i f  p i s  a  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i i ' i b r i u m  f o r  f, t h e n  f (p) E So; 
- - 
moreover p i s  a l s o  a  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  any 
-> 
payment s c h e d u l e  g such  t h a t  g(p-)E so. 
In view of these results, we shall sometimes refer to a 
canonical equilibrium (i.e., an equilibrium without opposition) 
without reference to any particular f. 
In Example 1 the set S O  = {~ayor, Controller, Council Presi- 
dent} is the unique critical set (and these the critical voters) 
when the minimum expectations of all members are the same. But 
the price vector of (3) is only in equilibrium for an f 
satisfying f (p) = SO. Why should the lobbyist choose this set 
- 
instead of some other equal-cost winning set, such as the Mayor 
plus any four of the Borough Presidents? First, the lobbyist 
has an interest in achieving a stable (i.e. equilibrium) 
solution, which the latter is not. But nore important, since, 
by ( l o ) ,  only the critical players are above their minima, they 
can lower their prices by a hair and be sure that they are in 
c v e r y  minimum cost winning set, so that the lobbyist is c e r t a i n  
to bribe them. Viewed in this light, we may say that the 
canonical equilibrium p and the corresponding f, where f (p) E So, 
- 
represent a kind of l i n l i t i n g  b e h a v i o r  on the part of both the 
voters and the lobbyist. 
The principal result for equilibria without opposition is 
the following [I 91 . 
0 ( 1 )  r .  For g i v e n  nifnirnurn crcpcc ta t?:ons  p und NO, SO a s  
- 
ahvvc:., p is a)! acqui l ibr iu~r i  w i t i z o ~ i t  d p p o s i t i o n  i f  and o n l y  
- 
LJ '  p Is i j ~ ~ t ! : i i ~ u m  f o r  t h e  l i n e u r  p r o g ~ ~ a n ~  
- 
(13) s u b j e c t  t o  p(S) 2 p ( ~ O )  f o r  a l l  S E S  and a l l  SO € S O  
- - - 
> Pi = pi f o r  ~ Z Z  i EN' 
Pi = Py f o r  a l l  i 4 N 0  
What this means is that, in equilibrium, the critical voters 
maximize their take, while making sure that they cannot be under- 
cut by some winning set not containing all of them. 
(14) T h i s  s o l u t i o n  h a s  a  n a t u r a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i n  t e r m s  o f  
i 
" s u b s t i t u t i o n " .  For a n y  v o t e r  i l e t  S be a  s m a l l e s t  
c a r ~ d i n a l i t y  w i n n i n g  s e t  c o n t a i n i n g  i. The minimum num- 
b e r  o f  v o t e r s  t h a t  c a n  be s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  i i n  some c h o i c e  
i 
o f  S and s t i l l  have  a  w i n n i n g  s e t  i s  d e n o t e d  b y  ri. 
(15) Theoren  [191. I f  G i s  a  w e i g h t e d  v o t i n g  game i n  w h i c h  
t h e r e  a r e  no v e t o  p l a y e r s ,  and  i f  a l l  o o t e r s  have  t h e  
0 
sJme minimum e x p e c t a t i o n ,  p , t h e n  e v e r y  c a n o n i c a l  
a q u i  l i b r i u m  p s a t  i a f i e s  
- 
( 1 6 )  pO(ri- 1 )  5 - p. 1 5 - POri w h e n e v e r  pi > . 
This theorem says that, if the minimum expectations of all 
voters are equal, then in equilibrium the price that a voter i 
may charge, if it is more than his minimum price must be 
approximately equal to times the number of voters who could 
replace him. It is precisely this possibility of substitution 
between voters that creates the conditions for equilibrium, 
since it prevents any one player from raising his price too high. 
In practice, the substitution theorem (15) holds also for 
many voting games that are not representable as weighted voting 
games. Consider the voting game consisting of the members of the 
United States House of Representatives (R), Senate (S), Vice- 
President (V), and President (P). We may represent the minimal 
winning sets of this game (the U.S. Federal Game) schematically 
as follows: 
Suppose that all members have, a prior;, the same minimum 
expectations, say $1000 each. Then it may be verified that the 
unique equilibrium without opposition is $88,000 for the Presi- 
dent and $1000 for everyone else. This result can also be 
arrived at by considering the substitution possibilities. Any 
voter (except the President) who tries to charge more than 
$1000 can be replaced by someone who is willing to charge less; 
the President, on the other hand, can hold out for 88 times 
this amount since it takes 88 voters to replace him. 
In equilibrium the lobbyist will, by (Il), bribe some set 
of form {218~,50S,V,P} or {218R,51S,P}, since these constitute 
SO. If we assume that he bribes any one of these with equal 
probability, we may compute the expected income, $i, of each 
player : 
where so is the number of sets in SO, and so is the number of 
sets in SO containing voter i. For the U.S. Federal Game this 
r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x p e c t e d  i n c o m e s  f o r  a  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  a  
S e n a t o r ,  a  V i c e - p r e s i d e n t ,  a n d  a  P r e s i d e n t  (wh ich  s h o u l d  b e  i n t e r -  
p r e t e d  a s  r e l a t i v e  a m o u n t s ) :  
R  $ 5 0 1 . 1 5  
S  $504 .95  
V $ 5 0 4 . 9 5  
P $ 8 8 , 0 0 0 . 0 0  . 
The  e x p e c t e d  i n c o m e s  o f  t h e  v o t e r s  s t a n d  i n  somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t  r a t i o s  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  t h a n  d o  t h e i r  p r i c e s .  S i n c e  
it i s  n o t  w h a t  a  v o t e r  c h a r g e s  b u t  w h a t  h e  g e t s  t h a t  m a t t e r s  
i n  t h e  e n d ,  we may r e g a r d  t h e  e x p e c t e d  i n c o m e s  a s  a  way o f  
e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  power o f  v a r i o u s  v o t e r s  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e i r  
a b i l i t y  t o  e x t r a c t  money f o r  t h e i r  v o t e s .  
The  e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  i m p o r t a n t  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  p a s s i n g  a  m e a s u r e  i s  e v i d e n t .  C o n s i d e r  now t h e  
- 
cornp leman  t a r ' y  gonit: G d e f i n e d  by  
i n  w h i c h  t h e  l o b b y i s t  is  t r y i n g  t o  buy v o t e s  t o  b l o c k  p a s s a g e  
o f  a  b i l l .  A g a i n  a s sume  t h a t  e a c h  p l a y e r  h a s  a  minimum p r i c e  o f  
$1000 .  The  complemen ta ry  game i s  d e s c r i b e d  by  t h e  m i n i m a l  
w i n n i n g  sets  
The  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  a n d  e x p e c t e d  i n c o m e s  t u r n  o u t  t o  
b e  a s  f o l l o w s :  
P r i c e  
R  $1000  
S  $1000 
v $1000 





$ 1 7 , 0 0 0  
For  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t s  g i v e n  by o t h e r  power 
i n d i c e s  we may c o n s i d e r  t h e  a v e r a g e  e x p e c t e d  income f rom p a s s i n g  
a n d  b l o c k i n g :  
The p r o p o r t i o n s  f o r  v a r i o u s  i n d i c e s  a r e  shown be low.  
Income Shap ley -Shub ik  Banzhaf  
R 1 . 0 0 0  1 . 0 0 0  1 . 0 0 0  
S  1 . 6 8 6  4 . 2 6 8  2 . 0 8 1  
V 1 . 0 0 8  2 . 7 3 2  2 . 0 8 1  
P  2 0 9 . 5 1 4  1 6 8 . 1 8 6  2 6 . 1 2 8  
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  a v e r a g e  S e n a t o r  p l a y s  a  more c r u c i a l  r o l e  
i n  t h e  b l o c k i n g  o f  a  m e a s u r e  t h a n  h i s  c o u n t e r p a r t  i n  t h e  House;  
moreove r  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  less p o w e r f u l  i n  h i s  a b i l i t y  
t o  b l o c k  t h a n  t o  p a s s .  (I t  s h o u l d  a l s o  b e  o b s e r v e d  t h a t ,  a 
p r i o r i ,  it i s  e a s i e r ,  i . e . ,  r e q u i r e s  less f u n d s ,  f o r  a  l o b b y i s t  
t o  b l o c k  a  measu re  t h a n  t o  p a s s  i t . )  
What,  t h o u g h ,  happens  when two l o b b y i s t s  compe te ,  o n e  o n  
e i t h e r  s i d e  o f  t h e  i s s u e ?  T h i s  i s  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  n e x t  
s e c t i o n .  
3 .  LOBBYING WITH OPPOSITION 
F o r  many t y p e s  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  it i s  d o u b t l e s s  t r u e  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  o n l y  o n e  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  g r o u p  t h a t  i s  d i r e c t l y  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  m a t t e r ,  and  wh ich  c a n  work more o r  less 
unopposed t o  a t t e m p t  t o  g e t  l e g i s l a t i o n  p a s s e d  t h a t  i s  p a r -  
t i c u l a r l y  b e n e f i c i a l  t o  i t s e l f  ( e . g . ,  s p e c i a l  t a x  l e g i s l a t i o n  
f o r  c e r t a i n  q u a l i f y i n g  g r o u p s ,  and  monopoly o r  l i c e n s e  r i g h t s ) .  
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  w i t h  t h e  a d v e n t  o f  c i t i z e n s '  a c t i o n  g r o u p s  t h a t  
p r o v i d e  a  f o c u s  f o r  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  a g a i n s t  
c e r t a i n  p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h e  phenomenon o f  c o m p e t i n g  l o b b i e s  
i s  i n c r e a s i n g l y  e n c o u n t e r e d .  I n  t h e s e  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s  a r e  i n  g e n e r a l  much 
l e s s  t h a n  t h e i r  c o m p e t i t o r s ' ;  t h i s  i s  i n  f a c t  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i n t e r e s t i n g  c a s e  t h a t  w e  s h a l l  examine  i n  d e t a i l .  
Bu t  a  model o f  v o t e  b u y i n g  by two c o m p e t i n g  f o r c e s  h a s  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f a r  beyond t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  l o b b y i n g .  F i r s t ,  i t  
h a s  i m p o r t a n t  a p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  e f f e c t i v e l y  
a l l o c a t i n g  campaign f u n d s  i n  e l e c t i o n s .  I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  t h e  
E l e c t o r a l  C o l l e g e  s y s t e m  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  is  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i n t e r e s t i n g  example .  Second ,  t h e  model p r o v i d e s  a  new a p p r o a c h  
t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  s e t t i n g  f a i r  " s a l a r i e s "  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  g o v e r n -  
ment  p o s i t i o n s :  h e r e  o n e  c a n  t h i n k  o f  t h e  l o b b y i s t  a s  b e i n g  i n  
c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  t h e  gove rnmen t ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  o b j e c t i v e  
b e i n g  t o  d i s c o u r a g e  b r i b e r y  a t t e m p t s  by s e t t i n g  s a l a r i e s  i n  
p r o p e r  b a l a n c e .  
T h i r d ,  a n d  mos t  i m p o r t a n t ,  t h e  model p r o v i d e s  y e t  a n o t h e r  
new a p p r o a c h  t o  m e a s u r i n g  power i n  v o t i n g  games t h a t  is  
d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h o s e  o f  Shap ley -Shub ik  a n d  o f  B a n z h a f .  
L e t  two  d i f f e r e n t  L o b b y i s t s  ( o r  p a r t i e s )  compe te  f o r  v o t e s  
i n  a  v o t i n g  game G =  ( N , S ) .  L e t  t h e  l o b b y i s t  who w i s h e s  t o  buy 
pro v o t e s  b e  c a l l e d  A, and t h e  l o b b y i s t  who w a n t s  c o n  v o t e s  b e  
c a l l e d  B. F u r t h e r ,  l e t  a h 0  b e  t h e  t o t a l  f i n a n c i a l  ( o r  e q u i v -  
a l e n t )  r e s o u r c e s  o f  A , b l O  t h e  t o t a l  f i n a n c i a l  ( o r  e q u i v a l e n t )  
r e s o u r c e s  o f  B. 
The o b j e c t  o f  e a c h  l o b b y i s t  w i l l  b e  t o  spend  more t h a n  h i s  
o p p o n e n t  o n  some s e t  o f  v o t e r s  c a p a b l e  o f  d e c i d i n g  t h e  i s s u e .  
Thus  i f  A  o f f e r s  p i  t o  v o t e r  i a n d  B  o f f e r s  q i  t o  v o t e r  i ,  
t h e n  i w i l l  s i d e  w i t h  A  i f  p i > q i ,  w i l l  s i d e  w i t h  B  i f  p i < q i ,  
a n d  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  a  t i e  ( w i t h  a  50-50 p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  i g o i n g  
e i t h e r  way) i f  p .  = q  
1 i '  
A pure  s t r a t e g y  f o r  A is a  p r i c e  v e c t o r  p = ( p l , .  . . , p n )  
s a t i s f y i n g  pzO,  ? p i l a ;  s i m i l a r l y  a  p u r e  s t r a t e g y  f o r  B i s  a  
p r i c e  v e c t o r  % =  ? q  l . . . . . q n ) ,  22 0. F q i r b .  W e  s a y  t h a t  
1 
A w i n s i f   EN: > q . ) E S  , 
( 1 9 )  i 
B w i n s  i f  { i E N :  q i  b p i )  4 S . 
T h i s  d e f i n e s  a  2 - p e r s o n ,  z e r o  sum game w i t h  p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n  
v_(e,q) a s  f o l l o w s .  
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t ies ,  we may e x t e n d  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  by l e t t i n g  
wA b e  t h e  number o f  sets S E S  s u c h  t h a t  p i z q i  f o r  a l l  i E S ,  
q i  2 pi f o r  a l l  i B s ,  a n d  wB b e  t h e  number o f  S  & S  s u c h  t h a t  
p i 2 q i  f o r  a l l  i E S ,  q i z p i  f o r  a l l  ~ B s .  Then 
L e t  
An e q u i l i b r i u m  p a i r  o f  p r i c e  v e c t o r s  i s  a p a i r  (el%) s u c h  
t h a t  P E P ,  % E Q _ ,  a n d  
- - 
An e q u i l i b r i u m  p a i r  i n  pure s t r a t e g i e s  d o e s  n o t  u s u a l l y  
e x i s t ,  s o  t h a t  o n e  i s  f o r c e d  t o  c o n s i d e r  mixed  s t r a t e g i e s  o v e r  
t h e  i n f i n i t e  se ts  5 a n d  Q.  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  a  mixed s t r a t e g y  f o r  
- 
A is a measure p defined on 5 such that p(P) = 1 and a mixed 
- 
strategy for B is a measure v on Q such that v(Q) = 1; the 
e x p e c t e d  payoff is 
assuming these integrals exist. Equilibrium pairs are defined 
analogously to (211, but explicit forms for the equilibrium 
measures (probability distributions) p and v are technically 
very difficult to compute, and perhaps difficult also to inter- 
pret: it is not clear that a lobbyist or campaign organization 
would ever in fact use such complex probability distributions to 
determine a strategy. The type of game defined by (19) - (22) is 
similar to a class known as C o l o n e l  B l o t t o  games, but differs in 
the objective function: in Colonel Blotto games a player wins 
a unit if he outbids his opponent on that unit, and the objective 
is to maximize the expected number of (weighted) units won (see 
for example [7,8,9,12,15]), whereas here the objective is to 
maximize the probability of winning (see Section 6 below). 
In this paper we shall focus on a particular case of the 
model in which a l i m i t i n g  equilibrium in pure strategies exists, 
and which therefore yields a solution to the problem that is 
practical to apply. Moreover, it is conjectured that this pure 
strategy solution is the same as the e x p e r t e d  p a y o f f  in games 
where the roles of the two lobbyists are symmetric, in which case 
it would represent quite a general value concept for voting games 
(see Section 4 below) . 
The case we shall consider is that in which one of the 
lobbyists, say B, has "substantially" more resources than A ,  
b >>a. The meaning of "substantially" will be made precise 
presently. This situation undoubtedly arises for many types 
of lobbying, as noted above, where opposition groups are thin 
and p o o r l y  f i n a n c e d ;  b u t  it  h a s  a l s o  f r e q u e n t l y  been t h e  c a s e  
i n  U . S .  P r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n s ,  where  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n s  were  o f t e n  
c o n s i d e r a b l y  b e t t e r - h e e l e d  t h a n  t h e  Democrats ( s e e  S e c t i o n  6  
below) . 
I f  one l o b b y i s t  ( o r  p a r t y ) ,  B, h a s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more 
f u n d s  t h a n  A ,  t h e n  he may i n  f a c t  be  i n  a  p o s i t i o n ,  by j u d i c i o u s  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  h i s  r e s o u r c e s ,  t o  entirely prevent A f rom 
s u c c e e d i n g  i n  buy ing  a  winn ing  s e t  o f  v o t e r s .  For  example ,  
suppose  l o b b y i s t  A h a s  $6000 t o  t r y  t o  p a s s  a  measure  t h r o u g h  
t h e  New York C i t y  Board o f  E s t i m a t e s ,  b u t  t h a t  t h e r e  is  a n  
i n t e r e s t  g r o u p  B opposed t o  t h e  measure  h a v i n g  a  b u d g e t  o f  
$11,800.  I f  B o f f e r s  t h e  amounts 
t o  t h e  e i g h t  members o f  t h e  Board ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  t h e n  A w i l l  be  
u n a b l e ,  w i t h i n  h i s  r e s o u r c e s ,  t o  make any c o u n t e r - o f f e r  s u c h  
t h a t  t h e  measure  w i l l  p a s s .  I n  f a c t ,  B ' s  b e s t  s t r a t e g y  w i l l  be 
t o  spend  as little as possible and s t i l l  be  c e r t a i n  o f  preven-  
t i n g  A f rom winn ing .  I t  i s  n o t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  t h a t  t h i s  is  
i n  f a c t  a c h i e v e d  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d i s t r i b u t i o n :  
where E i s  v a n i s h i n g l y  s m a l l .  I n  o t h e r  words ,  B can  spend  j u s t  
o v e r  $11,000 and t h w a r t  A .  We c a l l  s u c h  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ( i n  
t h e  l i m i t ,  a s  E g o e s  t o  0 )  a  defensive equilibrium f o r  B. 
N o t i c e  t h e  i n t e r e s t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t  is  p r e c i s e l y  
t h e  same a s  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  w i t h o u t  o p p o s i t i o n  when t h e  v o t e r s '  
i n i t i a l  minimum e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  e q u a l .  
In general, let G =  (N,S) be an arbitrary voting game, and 
suppose b x- a. B's objective is to find a p such that p(S) > a 
- 
for all S E S  and ?pi is a minimum with this property. In the 
1 
limit, this amounts to finding a p solving 
- 
min C p. 
i 
(2 3 )  subject to p(S) 2 a for all s K S  and p 2 0 . 
- - - 
Any optimal solution to the linear program (23) constitutes 
a defensive equilibrium for G (given resources a - 2 0 for lobbyist 
A). Notice that the relative value of an optimal f5 for (23) 
- 
does not depend on the value of a (for positive a) because 
(a1/a)P is optimal for a' > O  if and only if is optimal for 
- 
a > 0 ( e = O  if a=O). The meaning of B having "substantially" 
- 
more resources than A can now be made precise: if a(a) is the 
optimum value of (23), then B's resources must exceed n(a). 
Since (23) is always primal and dual feasible we have the 
following result. 
(24) For any voting game G a defensive equilibrium always 
exists, and normally it is unique (up to multiplication 
by a scalar). 
4. NEW VALUE CONCEPTS FOR VOTING GAMES 
The model of a single lobbyist buying votes was shown to 
lead to an equilibrium set of prices in any voting game without 
veto players. Moreover, the expected incomes to the players 
associated with this equilibrium gives a natural way of thinking 
about measuring relative power in a voting body. 
In the situation of two lobbyists competing for votes, a 
single set of voters' "pricesH--i.e., a pure strategy solution-- 
exists in the case where the lobbyists have substantially un- 
equal resources (in the sense defined in the preceding section). 
In this situation the prices are given by solving the linear 
program nin pi, subject to p 1 0  and p(S) >= a for some a > 0 and 
1 - % 
all winning sets S. As the relative values do not depend on a, 
we may normalize so that =Fpi=l. Then the equilibrium is 
- 1 
given by the compact formulation 
max min g(S) 
0 SES 
In the general case, when no restrictions are placed on 
the respective resources, a and b, of the two lobbyists, an 
equilibrium solution, if it exists, will be a pair of mixed 
strategies p and v. The relative values of the various voters 
may be defined in this case as the expected payoffs to each 
player 
These expected payoffs provide a new value concept for 
n-person simple games. 
A particularly natural case to investigate is the situation 
where the lobbyists have equal resources (a =b). While we shall 
not pursue this in detail here, we shall suggest what the answer 
is for a particular class of problems. We say that a voting 
game G is d e c i s i v e  (also sometimes called p r o p e r )  if, for every 
subset S of voters, exactly one of S, N - S  wins. An example of 
this situation is (weighted) simple majority rule with the total 
number of votes o d d .  Notice that in a decisive game G, the 
complement G is the same as G. Hence, for two lobbyists with 
equal resources, the associated 2-person game is completely 
symmetric in the two players. For this case, we propose that 
An  e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  t h e  t w o - l o b b y i s t  model  e x i s t s ,  
and t h e  ( n o r m a l i z e d )  e x p e c t e d  p a y o f f s  p t o  t h e  p l a y e r s  a r e  t h e  
N 
same a s  some pure  s t r a t e g y  s o Z u t i o n  i n  t h e  u n e q u a l  r e s o u r c e s  
c a s e ,  name ly ,  p s o Z v e s  
N 
max min p (S) 
- Eo SES 
Igl = l  
The expression (25) represents a new value concept for 
voting games (when the equilibrium exists) that differs from 
both the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik values. Some of its prop- 
erties in the case of weighted voting games are developed in Sec- 
tion 7. 
5. APPLICATION TO LEGISLATORS' SALARIES 
A second application of the two-lobbyist model is to provide 
a rationale for determining the r e l a t i v e  s a l a r i e s  of different 
legislators. Indeed, it can be said that one function of a 
legislator's salary is to protect him from the temptation of 
accepting bribes (assuming that accepting bribes is illegal). 
For, by accepting a bribe, the legislator risks losing his 
position, and hence his salary. One objective for setting 
salaries could be to find the most efficient distribution of 
salaries, that is, a distribution that minimizes the total cost 
to the state and protects against a given level of corruption. 
The solution is provided precisely by the defensive equilibrium 
computed from (23). 
However, since the desire is to protect legislators from 
attempted bribes to either pass  or b l o c k  a measure, we must 
consider the defensive equilibrium for both the voting game G 
and its complement G and see which solution dominates. To 
illustrate, let us compute salaries for the U.S. Federal Game. 
Since it is really only the r e l a t i v e  salaries we are interested 
in, the choice of a (the amount presumed to be available to a 
potential lobbyist) is arbitrary. Let us obtain a solution that 
protects against any lobbying effort of less than a =  $1,000,000. 
It is sufficient to compute the optimum to (23) using only the 
minimal  winning sets. It turns out that the program is degener- 
ate and there are two extreme optimal solutions: 
(ii) 
-
R 0 R 0 
S $14,925.37 S $14,925.37 
V $14,925.37 and v 0 
P $238,805.90 P $253,731.30 
These solutions (and any convex combination of them) give 
an optimal distribution of salaries needed to protect against 
the possibility that a lobbyist with $1,000,000 succeeds in 
p a s s i n g  a measure. That members of the House receive nothing 
in an efficient distribution reflects the peculiar circumstance 
that 67 out of 100 and 51 out of 100 are slightly larger majorities 
than 290 out of 435 and 218 out of 435, so that a dollar spent 
on protecting the Senate from bribery goes a little further than 
a dollar spent to protect the House. The "degenerate" role of 
the Vice-President reflects the fact that he is useful in pass- 
ing a measure only if the President also concurs. 
Now c o n s i d e r  t h e  complemen ta ry  game. S i n c e  it is e a s i e r  
t o  b l o c k  a  measu re  t h a n  t o  p a s s  i t ,  t h e  l o b b y i s t ' s  $ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
w i l l  go  f u r t h e r .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  l o b b y i s t  f rom s u c -  
c e s s f u l l y  b l o c k i r ~ y  a  m e a s u r e ,  h i g h e r  s a l a r i e s  t h a n  t h o s e  f o u n d  
above  w i l l  b e  r e q u i r e d :  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  u n i q u e  s o l u t i o n  i s  
which  a r e  i n  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n s  1  : 4 .27  : 4.27 : 72.67.  The 
P r e s i d e n t ' s  s a l a r y  i s  17 t i m e s  a  S e n a t o r ' s ,  w h i c h ,  it s h o u l d  
b e  n o t e d ,  i s  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  r a t i o  o f  t h e i r  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  
when a  l o b b y i s t  t r i e s  t o  b l o c k  a  measu re  unopposed ( u n d e r  t h e  
a s s u m p t i o n  o f  e q u a l  minimum e x p e c t a t i o n s  f o r  a l l  v o t e r s ) .  
The a c t u a l  s a l a r i e s  ( i n  1976)  w e r e  
The s o l u t i o n  ( 2 6 )  g i v e s  t o o  low a n  a b s o l u t e  s a l a r y  f o r  a  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  b u t  t h i s  depended  o n  o u r  a r b i t r a r y  c h o i c e  o f  
a = $ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 .  I n  f a c t ,  $44 ,600  may b e  t a k e n  a s  a  minimum 
a c c e p t a b l e  s a l a r y ,  a n d  t h e  s a l a r i e s  i n  ( 2 6 )  s c a l e d  up a c c o r d i n g l y ;  
t h i s  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e o r e t i c a l  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  a  l o b b y i s t  w i t h  
up t o  $ 9 , 7 2 2 , 7 9 1  i n  r e s o u r c e s .  
6 .  APPLICATION TO THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 
The E l e c t o r a l  C o l l e g e  and i t s  i n t r i g u i n g  g a m e - t h e o r e t i c  
a s p e c t s  have been t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  f o r  a  number 
o f  y e a r s .  Mann a n d  Shap ley  [ I11 computed t h e  r e l a t i v e  s t r e n g t h s  
o f  t h e  s t a t e s  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  Shapley-Shubik i n d e x  [ 1 7 ] ,  
a n d  showed t h a t  i n  f a c t  t h e  s t a t e s '  r e l a t i v e  s t r e n g t h  i s  v e r y  
n e a r l y  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e i r  a c t u a l  e l e c t o r a l  v o t e s .  While 
o n e  migh t  q u e s t i o n  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  o f  t h e  Shapley-Shubik 
i n d e x  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  c o n t e x t  ( s i n c e  it i s  based  on t h e  n o t i o n  
o f  a n  n -person  game p l a y e d  b e t w e e n  t h e  s t a t e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  a  
2-person game p l a y e d  f o r  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  v o t e s  o f  t h e  s t a t e s ,  
n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  it  i s  an  i n t e r e s t i n g  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  d e f e n s i v e  
e q u i l i b r i u m  o b t a i n e d  f rom t h e  p r e s e n t  model is p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  
t h e  e l e c t o r a l  v o t i n g  w e i g h t s  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  s t a t e s .  Y e t  a n o t h e r  
a p p r o a c h  t o  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  r e l a t i v e  power o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  s t a t e s  
i s  d u e  t o  Banzhaf 121. C o l a n t o n i ,  Levesque,  and Ordeshook [ S ]  
a n a l y z e  some o f  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  e v i d e n c e  i n  t h e  l i g h t  of s e v e r a l  
d i f f e r e n t  p o s s i b l e  a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  c a n d i d a t e ' s  o b j e c t i v e  
f u n c t i o n s  and  v o t e r  r e s p o n s e s  and c o n c l u d e  t h a t  a  " m o d i f i e d "  
t y p e  o f  p r o p o r t i o n a l  a l l o c a t i o n  seems a s  p1aus ib l . e  a s  v a r i o u s  
o t h e r  h y p o t h e s e s .  Brams and Davis  [ 3 , 4 ]  d e v e l o p  a n  approach  
c a l l e d  t h e  'I3/* ' S  r u l e "  which l e a d s  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  l a r g e  
s t a t e s  a r e  f a v o r e d  o u t  o f  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e i r  s i z e .  A h o s t  o f  
o t h e r  mode l s ,  a n a l y s e s  and a rguments  have been p r e s e n t e d  o v e r  
t h e  y e a r s  t o  show v a r i o u s  p u r p o r t e d  a d v a n t a g e s  o r  d i s a d v a n t a g e s  
o f  t h e  E l e c t o r a l  C o l l e g e ;  f u r t h e r  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  t h i s  l i t e r a t u r e  
may be found i n  [ 4 1  . 
The E l e c t o r a l  C o l l e g e  may b e  d e s c r i b e d  a s  a  w e i g h t e d  v o t i n g  
game i n  which t h e  50 s t a t e s  and t h e  D i s t r i c t  o f  Columbia p l a y  
t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  v o t e r s .  The t o t a l  w e i g h t  i s  538, and a m a j o r i t y  
o f  270 i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  win. I n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  l o b b y i n g  model 
d e v e l o p e d  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  s e c t i o n ,  a n  a p p e a l i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  
c o m p e t i t i o n  f o r  e l e c t o r a l  v o t e s  is t h a t  campaign fund  a l l o c a t i o n s  
f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e  a r e  l e g a l  ( w i t h i n  c e r t a i n  ground r u l e s ) ,  and 
t h e r e f o r e  d a t a  a r e  more r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e .  A second f e a t u r e  i s  
that minimum expectations do not seem to play an important 
role, in part because the process is legal: any campaign 
expenditure on a state, however small, is certainly "acceptable"; 
the only question might be whether expenditures below a certain 
threshold "do any good". This latter point may in fact impose, 
implicitly, certain lower bounds but for present purposes 
- 
we will assume that = 0. 
For this problem it is clear that the two-lobbyist model 
is more relevant than that of one lobbyist acting without 
opposition. We shall be interested in the situation in which 
one of the parties has "substantially" more funds than the 
other. In this case "substantially" means roughly twice as much 
(or, more precisely, more than 5 3 8 / 2 7 0  times as much; see the 
following section). 
The advantage of this case is that it has an equilibrium 
solution in pure strategies, whereas in the case of equal 
resources, for example, the strategies are probability distri- 
butions that are difficult (though, in principle, possible) to 
compute. Moreover, precisely the unequal resources case has 
arisen frequently in U.S. Presidential elections.* In Table 2  
are shown aggregate expenditures by the Republican and the Demo- 
cratic National Committees for every Presidential election from 
1 9 4 8  to 1 9 6 8 .  Also shown are expenditures by Labor National 
Committees, which, we may assume, contributed most of their 
resources in support of Democratic candidates. It will be seen 
that the Republicans outspent the Democrats by a ratio of ap- 
proximately 2  to 1  in 1 9 5 2 ,  1 9 5 6 ,  and 1 9 6 8  (and the Republicans 
won in each of these years). The data are probably not wholly 
reliable, so that these must be regarded as estimates, especially 
in view of Labor's uncertain contribution to specific candidates. 
Thus, in analyzing the 1 9 6 8  data (the only one of the above three 
for which detailed state-by-state information is available) we 
shall assume that the Republicans were approximately in the position 
*This situation may change, however, due to recent electoral 
law reforms in the United States. 
Table 2. National Committee Expenditures 1 9 4 8 - 1 9 6 8  ($US). 
Republicans 3 ,686 ,779  12 ,229 ,239  13 ,220 ,144  
I Democrats 2 ,266 ,261  5 ,121 ,698  6 , 4 9 2 , 6 3 4 '  I Labor 1 , 2 9 1 , 7 3 3  2 ,070 ,350  1 ,805 ,482  i 
1 9 6 0  1 9 6 4  1 9 6 8  
Republicans 12 ,950 ,232  19 ,314 ,796  29 ,563 ,337  1 Democrats 1 1 , 8 0 0 , 9 7 9  13 ,348 ,791  1 3 , 5 7 7 , 7 1 5  I 
Labor 2 ,450 ,944  3 ,816 ,242  7 ,631 ,868  
Source: [ 1 8 1 .  
of having enough resources to employ a purely "defensive" strategy, 
even though the above numbers do not prove this. Under the above 
assumptions, an efficient strategy for the Republicans in these 
years would have been to allocate funds according to the defensive 
equilibrium calculated from ( 2 3 ) ,  where a is the amount of funds 
available to the Democrats (assumed known). 
In fact, it may be shown that in 1 9 6 8 ,  
( 2 7 )  t h e  d e f e n s i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  E l e c t o r a l  
C o l l e g e  i s  p r e c i s e l y  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  v o t i n g  s t r e n g t h s  
o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  s t a t e s ,  i . e .  t o  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  numbers 
o f  E l e c t o r s .  
This result is established computationally and depends on 
the particular distribution of voting strengths in 1 9 6 8 .  A 
similar result holds for the 1 9 7 2  voting strengths. See also 
the following section, where an explicit relationship between 
the defensive equilibrium and voting weight is established for 
decisive simple majority games. 
By way of comparison with other indices, it is interesting 
to note that the Shapley-Shubik (SS) values for the Electoral 
College [ 10 ,111  are also very nearly proportional to the states' 
a c t u a l  v o t i n g  s t r e n g t h s .  The l a r g e s t  s t a t e s  have  a n  SS v a l u e  o f  
o n l y  a b o u t  52 more t h a n  t h e i r  v o t i n g  s t r e n g t h ,  whereas  t h e  s m a l l -  
e s t  s t a t e s  have  a  v a l u e  o f  o n l y  a b o u t  3% l e s s  t h a n  t h e i r  v o t i n g  
s t r e n g t h .  The SS v a l u e s  a r e  t h e r e f o r e  v e r y  c l o s e  t o  t h o s e  g i v e n  
by t h e  p r e s e n t  t h e o r y ,  and a r e  p r o b a b l y  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  i n d i s t i n -  
g u i s h a b l e  f rom them. 
The Brams-Davis ' / z ' s  r u l e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  p r e d i c t s  a  
v e r y  s u b s t a n t i a l  b i a s  i n  f a v o r  o f  l a r g e  s t a t e s .  The Brams-Davis 
model p o s t u l a t e s  t h a t ,  i n  any s t a t e  i ,  a n  ( u n d e c i d e d )  v o t e r ' s  
" p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  v o t i n g "  R e p u b l i c a n  ( s a y )  i s  e q u a l  t o  r i / ( r  + d . ) ,  
1 1  
where  r i  i s  t h e  amount s p e n t  by t h e  R e p u b l i c a n s ,  d i  t h e  amount 
s p e n t  by t h e  Democra t s ,  i n  s t a t e  i. Each o f  t h e  two c a n d i d a t e s  
i s  s u p p o s e d  t o  have  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t r y i n g  t o  m a x i m i z e  h i s  
t o t a l  e l e c ~ o r a l  v o t e .  I t  may be s e e n  however ( a s  Brams and  
D a v i s  t h e m s e l v e s  r e m a r k )  t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  same a s  t r y i n g  
t o  maximize  o n e ' s  c h a n c e  o f  w i n n i n g ,  which i s  p resumably  t h e  
c a n d i d a t e s '  t r u e  o b j e c t i v e ,  and t h e  o n e  assumed i n  t h i s  model .  
C o n s i d e r  an  example  h a v i n g  t h r e e  s t a t e s  and  " e l e c t o r a l "  v o t e s  
1 0 , 1 0 , 1  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  w i t h  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  11 r e q u i r e d  t o  win .  
Then t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t r y i n g  t o  maximize t o t a l  e l e c t o r a l  v o t e  
w i l l  l e a d ,  i n c o r r e c t l y ,  t o  a n  o v e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n  on t h e  f i r s t  
two s t a t e s .  T h i s  r e s u l t s  f rom t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  t h i r d  p l a y e r  
i s  i n  r e a l i t y  j u s t  a s  " s t r o n g "  a s  t h e  two o t h e r s ,  even  though  
h i s  w e i g h t  i s  much d i f f e r e n t .  
An e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  i n  p u r e  s t r a t e g i e s  w i l l ,  g e n e r a l l y ,  
e x i s t  o n l y  i n  t h e  r a t h e r  e x t r e m e  c a s e  t h a t  o n e  c a n d i d a t e  h a s  
more t h a n  n  t i m e s  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  o t h e r ,  n  b e i n g  t h e  number 
o f  s t a t e s .  The "3 /~ ' s  r u l e " ,  however ,  i s  d e r i v e d  by as suming  
t h a t  b o t h  c a n d i d a t e s  have  e q u a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  and moreover  t h a t  
t h e y  e x a c t l y  ma tch  each  o t h e r ' s  e x p e n d i t u r e  i n  e v e r y  s t a t e .  
Thus it d o e s  n o t  r e a l l y  a p p l y  t o  t h e  p a r t i e s '  p o s i t i o n s  i n  t h e  
1968 e l e c t i o n .  (However, s i n c e  Brams and Dav i s  u s e  t h e  t o t a l  
numbsr o f  a p p e a r a n c e s  o f  a  c a n d i d a t e  and h i s  r u n n i n g  ma te  a s  a  
measure  o f  r e s o u r c e  a l l o c a t i o n ,  t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  d i d  have e q u a l  
r e s o u r c e s  i n  t h i s  s e n s e . )  
Expenditure data by party and state for the 1968 Presidential 
election do not seem to be available. As a rather crude substi- 
tute, we will use expenditure for local (nonnetwork) political 
b r o a d c a s t s  by party and state, as reported by the Federal Commu- 
nications commission [6]. While these data aggregate Presidential 
campaign spending with Congressional and some local races, the 
Presidential spending represents the principal component. (More- 
over, expenditures by candidates from the same party tend to 
reinforce each other, due to the "coat-tail" effect.) Expendi- 
tures on nationwide (i.e. network) campaign broadcasts are not 
included; if they were, they would presumably be allocated to the 
various states in proportion to the audiences receiving them. 
Consistent with the parties' respective overall budgets 
(Table 2), total spending on Presidential campaign broadcasts by 
the Republicans was about twice that of the Democrats ([6,p.l]). 
According to (27), a theoretically optimum strategy for 
the Republicans would have been to spend in proportion to a 
state's number of electoral votes. The expenditure data for 
1968, aggregated by large, medium, and small states following 
Brams' and Davis' classification (see Table 3 1 ,  indicate that 
Table 3 .  Campaign Allocation Bias by State Size - 1968. 
Equilibrium 
Allocation 




*Large s t a t e s  a r e  those having more than 20 e l e c t o r a l  vo tes  ( 7  i n  19681, 
medium s t a t e s  a r e  those having between 10 and 20 e l e c t o r a l  votes  (14 
i n  1968),  and small s t a t e s  a r e  those with l e s s  than 10 e l e c t o r a l  vo tes  
(30 i n  1968) [ 41. 
**Nonnetwork broadcast  spending, including Congressional and some l o c a l  races .  
t h e  Republ icans  c h o s e  a  s t r a t e g y  f a v o r i n g  t h e  l a r g e  s t a t e s  a t  
t h e  expense  m a i n l y  o f  t h e  s m a l l  s t a t e s .  The s o l u t i o n  d e v i a t e s  
f rom p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y ,  b u t  by l e s s  thar ,  t h e  '12's r u l e  p r e d i c t s .  
Given t h e  dominant  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n s  i n  
1968,  a  p o s s i b l e  c o n c l u s i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e y  may have o v e r a l l o c a t e d  
f u n d s  t o  t h e  l a r g e  s t a t e s  i n  t h e i r  s p e n d i n g  s t r a t e g y .  
7 .  RESULTS FOR WEIGHTED VOTING GAMES 
The E l e c t o r a l  C o l l e g e  i s  a  s p e c i a l  c a s e  o f  a  we igh ted  
v o t i n g  game and  t h e  e q u i l i b r i a  b o t h  w i t h  and w i t h o u t  o p p o s i t i o n  
e n j o y  s p e c i a l  r e g u l a r i t y  p r o p e r t i e s  f o r  t h i s  t y p e  o f  game. 
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  suppose  G i s  a  we igh ted  v o t i n g  game w i t h  r e p r e s e n -  
t a t i o n  ( q ;  w l , w 2 ,  ..., w n )  and t h a t  w l  z w 2  2 ... z w n .  
( 2 8 )  Theorem.  T h e r e  i s  a  d e f e n s i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  G 
a g a i n s t  a  s u c h  t h a t  pl 2_ p2 2 . . . 2 pn. 
The p r o o f  i s  o b t a i n e d  by s e l e c t i n g  a n  optimum p f o r  t h e  
- 
l i n e a r  program ( 2 3 )  h a v i n g  a s  few "bad p a i r s "  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  where 
( i ,  j  ) i s  a  bad p a i r  i f  i < j  and P .  < P I n  f a c t  we may choose  
1 j .  
j3 and ( i , j )  s u c h  t h a t  p h z F j  f o r  a l l  h  < i  and p k z P i  f o r  a l l  
- 
k > j .  L e t t i n g  E = ( p  - p i ) / 2  it may t h e n  b e  shown t h a t  
- j 
= ( P I ,  . . . , $ . + ~ , . . . p . - € , . . . p n )  i s  a n  optimum h a v i n g  fewer  bad 
3 
p a i r s  t h a n  p.  I n d e e d ,  we have 2 2. Moreover,  f o r  
- 
- 
a l l  S  E S ,  p ( S )  z p ( S )  L a  u n l e s s  p e r h a p s  i g ~ ,  j E S .  But t h e n ,  
- - - - 
s i n c e  wi 2 w j ,  S '  = S  + i - j E  S ,  s o  E ( S )  = P ( S '  ) -Pi + F. 2 a ,  
3 - 
whence P ( S )  2 a  + 2E SO F ( s )  2 a  a n d  i s  f e a s i b l e .  T h e r e f o r e  
- - - - 
i s  o p t i m a l ,  s i n c e  C Ei = Z 5 .  . 
- 1 i 
W e  s a y  t h a t  a  s e t  o f  minimum e x p e c t a t i o n s  i s  r e g u l a r  
f o r  t h e  w e i g h t e d  v o t i n g  game G ( a s  above)  i f  p y  L p ;  2 . . . > - pz. 
The f o l l o w i n g  i s  a  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  a  theorem i n  [ I  91 . The 
proof  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  ( 2 8 ) .  
(29)  Theorem.  I f  G has  no v e t o  p l a y e r s  and minimum 
e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  r e g u l a r ,  t h e n  t h e r e  i s  an  e q u i l i b r i u m  w i t h o u t  
- 
o p p o s i t i o n  p s a t i s f y i n g  PI  2 fj2 2 . . . 2 pn. 
- 
In the preceding section we noted the fact that the 
1968 voting weights for the Electoral College were actually 
p r o p o r t i o n a l  to the defensive equilibrium, and similarly 
for the 1972 weights. This is a rather special situation, 
since, in general, a weighted voting game may have several 
d i f f e r e n t  representations as a weighted voting game, but 
normally only one defensive equilibrium. However for an 
important class of games, namely the decisive simple majority 
games, more can be said. 
(30) Theorem.  I f  G i s  a  d e c i s i v e  s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y  game and 
- p i s  a  d e f e n s i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  u g a i n s t  r e s o u r c e  l e v e l  a > O ,  
t h e n  (a; P1 ,p2,.. . ,pn) i s  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  f o r  G .  
P r o o f :  Let G have representation (q; w1,w2, ..., wn). 
We can choose q = min y(S). Since q > 0 by definition, 
SES 
define = (a/q)w_. Then 8 satisfies 
G , o ,  
- - 
(31 &(s) 2 a if and only if S E S . 
In particular, is f e a s i b l e  for (23) ; moreover, by 
choice of q, (31) holds as an e q u a l i t y  for some S' ES, so 
Let p be an opt imum to (23). To show that fj is a set of 
- - 
weights for G we must show that 
E(S) - > a i f a n d o n l y i f  S E S  . 
Now p(S) , a for all S E S, by feasibility. If p(S) 2 a for some, 
- - - 
S 4 S, then since G is a decisive simple majority game, N - S E S  and 
E(N-s) 2 a. But then ZP. > 2a whereas FCi< 2a, contradicting 
-1 = 
optimality .U 1 
8. CONCLUSION 
The intent of this paper has been two-fold. First, given 
lobbying and campaigning as a fact of life in the political 
sphere, we ask how should a calculating lobbyist allocate his 
funds most effectively to achieve his goals? Two models were 
presented: the case of one lobbyist acting unopposed, and the 
case of two opposing lobbyists; and each was shown to lead to 
a certain concept of equilibrium payments to voters. These 
solutions may find a practical application by practitioners of 
lobbying and campaigning. But the models also have a theoretical 
interest: they provide a new approach to the problem of finding 
a normative measure of power in a voting system. In fact, two 
new measures of power were defined. While they are related in 
certain ways, their differences also point to the importance of 
considering the context of the problem in which power is to be 
measured. 
Of course, the models we have described are idealized, 
and--some may say--too cynical: surely not everybody's vote can 
be bought. Suppose then that some voters are immune to influence, 
that their minds are made up (pro or con). Let UCN be the set 
of voters a p r i o r i  for the measure, V the set of voters irrevo- 
cably against. (In the case of lobbying without opposition, we 
might say that the minimum expectation of every voter in U is 
zero, whereas the minimum expectation of every voter in V is 
plus infinity.) If U wins, or N - V  loses, a lobbyist can do 
nothing. Otherwise, a lobbyist (or opposing lobbyists) can try 
to influence the "swing" voters by proceeding as if the game were 
where 
S' = {S C N - U  U V :  S U U E S} , 
and prices are determined accordingly. 
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